COMMENTS
Involuntary Dismissals of Class Actions
The class action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'
attempt to provide an effective means for the protection of rights that
would not ordinarily be asserted through individual actions. 2 The
possibility of recovery of large attorney's fees has led to an inundation
of the federal courts with class actions, many of which have little merit
or are of negligible importance to class members.3 The problem currently facing legislatures and courts is to ensure that the rule fulfills its
original purpose while at the same time preventing abuse of the class
action device.
It has been suggested that the provisions of the rule that deal with
compromises and dismissals can play a large part in lessening the strains
class actions have placed on the already overburdened federal judiciary.4 Rule 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise of the class action shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
The vast majority of class actions are disposed of before trial,5 by vol1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2 See Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REcv. 501 (1969); Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CH. L. REv. 684 (1941); Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in
Class Actions, 9 BuFFALO L. REv. 433 (1960); Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1969).
3 See, e.g., the statement of District Judge Weinfeld in Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v.
Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972): "However, it is not idle to observe that class
actions, which have proliferated tremendously since the advent of the current Rule--indeed beyond the expectations of its sponsors-threaten to engulf the courts; that substantial questions have been raised whether the Rule, intended to benefit the small consumer
or invstor who otherwise would have no means of redress, has really achieved its promise,
or rather whether it has resulted in miniscule recoveries by its intended beneficiaries
while lawyers have reaped a golden harvest of fees."
4 Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 971, 976 (1971).
Professor Dole focuses on the role voluntary dismissals could play in the area; this comment examines the problems posed by involuntary dismissals.
5 For example, since 1966 no antitrust or securities dass action has proceeded through
trial to an actual determination of damages. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERs, REPORT
AND IEcOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RuLE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RuL s OF
CrviL PROCEDURE 15-16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as REPORT AND REcOMMENDATIONS].
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untary or involuntary dismissal. The notice and court approval provisions of rule 23(e), however, have usually been construed as applying
only to voluntary dismissals. 6 Appropriate procedural regulation of involuntary dismissals is essential to the proper functioning of the class
action device. This comment examines the legal and practical effects of
involuntary dismissals on the interests of class members under present
law and evaluates several procedural modifications that would more
adequately serve the purposes of rule 23.
I. THE PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.

Rule 23

The class action originated in equity as a device enabling the court
to proceed to judgment where the parties were too numerous to all
be brought before the court.7 The first version of rule 23, adopted in
1937, designated three categories as appropriate for class action treatment: where the right sued upon was joint or common to the members of the class; where the rights asserted were several but the relief
sought by all members affected the same specific property; and where
the rights asserted were several but there was a common question of law
or fact and a common type of relief was sought. 8 These categories were
soon denominated "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class actions respectively. 9 Only in a "true" class action did the decree rendered have
full res judicata effects as to absent members of the class. 10 The judgment in a "hybrid" class action had limited res judicata effects," 1 and
the judgment in a "spurious" class suit had no binding effects on ab12
sent class members.
6 3B

J. MooRE, ]FEDERAL PRACTICE

23.80 [21],[3] (1969).

7 See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 95-97 (2d ed. 1840).

8 The simple definition found in the equity rules of when an action might be maintained as a class action was rejected. Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912), provided: "When the
question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the whole."
23.02-1.
9 3B J. MooRE, supra note 6,
10 See cases cited id.

23.11[2].

11 The "hybrid" class action involved situations in which claims were made against
specific property. Judgment transferring the property was res judicata, but claims of those
not actually parties to the action were not cut off as against the owner of the property.
See cases cited id. 23.11[4].
12 Indeed, a "spurious" class suit was little more than provision for permissive joinder.
See cases cited id. 23.11[3]. Some courts did take the view that members of the class could
intervene after judgment favorable to the class and take under the judgment even though
they would not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment. Id.
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The 1966 revision of rule 23 responded to the confusion surrounding classification of cases and the restrictive effect given judgments
in "spurious" class actions by rejecting the "true-hybrid-spurious"
classification 3 and specifically providing that a judgment rendered in
any class action maintained under the rule is binding on all those the
court determines to be members of the class. 14 The old classifications
were replaced with functional definitions of controversies appropriate
for class action treatment. 5 A class action may now be maintained under subdivision (b)(1) of the rule where a risk of inconsistent adjudications exists or where an adjudication of the rights of one party would be
dispositive of the interests of other persons. Subdivision (b)(2) allows
class actions for injunctive or declaratory relief where such relief is the
appropriate remedy for all members of the class.' 6 Class actions are
maintainable under subdivision (b)(3) if the court finds that common
questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other means for
the adjudication of the controversy. The expansion in res judicata
effects of "spurious" class actions, generally maintainable as "common
question" actions under (b)(3), has been a primary motivation for the
increased use of the class action device and the resultant burdens on
7
the federal judiciary.'
The relatively slight connection between class members in (b)(3)
actions creates the possibility that res judicata effects could be imposed
on a class member without his knowledge or acquiescence. To prevent
this from occurring, the rule requires that the "best notice practicable"
be given to all members of the (b)(3) class, informing them that a class
suit is being maintained on their behalf and giving them the opportunity to avoid being bound by a final judgment by opting out of the
action if they so desire.' 8 In contrast, the rule does not require any preliminary notice to members of the class in (b)(1) or (b)(2) class suits. 19
'3 The committee noted that the classification had proved "obscure and uncertain."
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 89 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966).
34 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
15 Amendments To Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 18, at 99.
10 While (b)(2) actions are mainly civil rights class actions, the Advisory Committee
noted that other applications were possible. Id. at 102.
17 See REPORT AND RCOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at 10-12. This is apparently contrary to the expectations of the Advisory Committee. Compare Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81
HARV. L. REv. 356, 894-96 (1967) with REPORT AND RiCOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, at
4-6.
18 FED. R. Cri. P. 23(c)(2).
19 The circuits are divided on whether due process requires notice to members of the
class in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions. Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
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Settlements and Dismissals under Rule 23
The 1937 version of rule 23 provided that a class action could
not be dismissed without the approval of the court. This represented an
2
attempt to guard against the collusion and strike-suiting o that had
marked the class action device prior to the adoption of the rule, 21 abuses
that had been greatly facilitated by the common holding that a class
action would be dismissed at the request of the class representative at
any time prior to the entry of a decree affecting the rights of absent
parties 22 Prior to the rule a plaintiff was free to use the leverage afforded by his purported representation of a class to extract, without regard to the interests of the class, a settlement that would inure to his
benefit alone. The original rule 23, by requiring court approval of settlements and dismissals, did much to correct this situation.
An additional protection was provided by requiring notice to class
Members when a dismissal or compromise of a "true" class suit, binding
B.

on all members of the class, was presented to the court.23 By requiring
notice of the pending settlement the rule attempted to give the court
the benefit of the views of those class members who objected to the
settlement. This provision was designed to prevent the named parties
from collusively presenting only such information as would lead the
court to approve the settlement. The 1966 amendments to rule 23 that
made judgments in class actions binding on all class members included
a corresponding extension of the requirement of notice of a dismissal
or compromise.
As noted earlier, it is generally agreed that the notice and court approval provisions of rule 23(e), like those of its predecessor, are applicable only to voluntary dismissals. 24 The only justification offered for
the exclusion of involuntary dismissals from the safeguards of rule
23(e) is that because involuntary dismissals "presumably could not involve collusion or benefit the representative plaintiffs at the expense of
the remaining class members, the protection afforded by giving notice
555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968) with Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (Ist Cir. 1972) and
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972).
20 A strike suit is an action brought not in good faith but in hopes of forcing a settlement for a sum disproportionate to the normal value of the claim through exploitation
of the nuisance value of the action.
21

See Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 CoLtru.

L. REv.

1308 (1934).
23.80[4]; Annot., 8 A.L.R. 950 (1920).
22 See cases cited 3B J. MooRa, supra note 6,
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), 308 U.S. 690 (1939). This rule was interpreted to apply only to
voluntary dismissals.
24 See, e.g., Pelelas v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940); Dologow
v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664, 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972);
cases cited 3B J. MooRE, supra note 6, 23.80[3].
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to absentees is not required."2 5 This presumption is erroneous. A compromise or settlement can easily be disguised as an involuntary dismissal. Failure to extend the rule to involuntary dismissals thus opens the
way to collusion and strike-suiting.
C.

Involuntary Dismissals under the Federal Rules

Rule 23 makes no special provision for involuntary dismissals of class
actions; therefore, the provisions of the federal rules that generally
govern involuntary dismissals are applicable. Rule 41(b) provides in
part: "Unless the court in its order of dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for failure to join a party under rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." 26 In other words, dismissal is with prej27
udice unless the court or the rule specifically states otherwise.
Involuntary dismissals may be entered for a number of reasons. For
example, rule 41(b) permits involuntary dismissal for failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute, and rule 37 grants the court discretionary power
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to make discovery.28 Rule
41(b) dismissals of class actions that are not specified to be without prejudice conclude the rights of absent class members without providing
the safeguards of rule 23(a). 29 This situation raises the question of
whether an involuntary dismissal that concludes the rights of absent
class members is consistent with established principles of due process.
25 7A C. WVRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAMnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1797,

at

235 (1972).

26 The rule was drafted in this fashion to obviate speculation about the effect of an
involuntary dismissal by making it dear that a dismissal is with prejudice unless the court
or the rule specifically states otherwise. 5 J. MooRE, supra note 6,
41.14[l] (1971).
27 The specific exemption in the rule of dismissals for lack of jurisdiction has been
construed by the Supreme Court "as encompassing those dismissals which are based on
a plaintiff's failure to comply with a precondition requisite to the Court's going forward
to determine the merits of his substantive claims." Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265,
285 (1961). The rule was thus made to conform to the general principle previously established by the Court that an involuntary dismissal does not bar a subsequent action if it is
grounded on some matter preliminary to a consideration of the merits by the court. Swift
v. McPherson, 232 U.S. 51, 56 (1914); Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237
(1866). For application of this rule in a class action context, see Saylor v. Lindsley, 391
F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968). A dismissal of a suit brought as a class action for failure to
satisfy the prerequistes of subdivisions (a) and (b) necessary for certification of a class
action, being on a matter preliminary to consideration of the merits, must, therefore, be
without prejudice to the rights of the purported class.
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) provides that an action may, in the discretion of the court,
be dismissed for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d)
provides a like discretionary sanction for failure to make discovery that may be requested without court approval.
29 See text and notes at notes 30-65 infra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY INVOLUNTARY DISMISSALS
OF CLASS ACTIONS

A.

Adequacy of Representation

It is an established rule of due process that in order for a person to
be bound by the judgment of a court he must be brought before the
court and made a party to the action. 30 Class actions are an exception
to this general rule.3 1 Not all members of the class need be brought
before the court, but if absent members are to be bound by the judgment, established principles of due process require that their interests
be adequately represented.3 2 In Smith v. Swormstedtm the Supreme
Court stated that "where... a few are permitted to sue and defend on
behalf of the many, by representation, care must be taken that persons
are brought on the record fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried." 34 Rule 23 incorporates this due process standard by demanding, as a prerequisite to
class action status, a court determination that the representative will ade-

quately represent absent class members.3 5
Adequacy of representation requires both competent counsel and a
class representative who will vigorously prosecute class claims. 36 The
requirement of competence of chosen counsel is satisfied if he is "qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation."37 Inquiry into the quality of the representation that will be provided by the representative himself is more extensive.38
1. The Representative Party. The basic criterion of representation
is "the forthrightness and vigor with which the representative party can
be expected to assert and defend the interests of the members of the
class so as to assure them due process."39 Involuntary dismissals generally create doubts concerning the zeal with which the interests of the
plaintiff class have been pursued by the representative.
30 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918); Old Wayne Mutual Life
Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
31 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938);
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs,
237 U.S. 662 (1915); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 188 (1853).
32 Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691-92 (1961); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 867
(1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853).
33 57 US. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
34 Id. at 303.
35 FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
36 See cases cited 7 C. WRIGirr & A. MILLER, supra note 25, § 1766, at 632-33 (1972).
37 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
38 See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 25, §§ 1766-71.
39 Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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In a recent case, Papilsky v. Berndt,40 the Second Circuit was confronted with many of the questions raised by the involuntary dismissal
of a class action. An earlier stockholder's derivative action on the same
claim, White & Bernstein v. Driscoll,41 had been dismissed for failure
to answer interrogatories. The defendants in Papilsky sought summary
judgment arguing that, because the dismissal in White had not been
stated to be without prejudice and the Papilsky plaintiff had been a
member of the class represented in White, rules 37 and 41(b) rendered
the White dismissal a decision on the merits-and res judicata as to the
plaintiff in Papilsky. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of summary judgment by carving out an exception to the general
principles of rule 41(b) "for derivative suits dismissed for failure to
answer interrogatories." 42 After a lengthy discussion of the reasons for
requiring notice of involuntary dismissals of class actions, the court
stated that "[a] dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories cannot accurately be characterized as either a voluntary dismissal or a dismissal
following a hearing on the merits."43 The court admitted that a dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories has some of the attributes of an
adjudication on the merits, but "on balance," it viewed such dismissals
as "more analogous to voluntary dismissals." 44 The court therefore concluded that notice of the dismissal should have been given to nonparty
class members and that a judgment without such notice was not binding on absent class members.
The decision in Papilsky was technically based on the failure to give
notice of a "voluntary" dismissal. The motivation behind the decision,
however, may be indicated by the court's concern that "a dismissal for
failure to answer interrogatories could easily disguise a collusive settlement," 45 and that a "fainthearted" plaintiff could prejudice the interests
of the entire class.46 The court specifically noted the special master's
finding in White that the plaintiffs were "not serious in prosecuting [the] action . . .-47 and a First Circuit decision 8 holding that facts
40 466 F.2d 251 (1972). This was a stockholders' derivative action under FED. R. CIV. P.
23.1; the language of rule 23.1 dealing with dismissals is identical to that of rule 23 and
courts have employed the same standards in dealing with dismissals under both rules.
41 Civil No. 67-98 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 9,1968).
42 466 F.2d at 256.
43 Id. at 259.
44 Id.

45 Id. The court's footnote to this statement, disclaiming any inference of wrongdoing
by the White plaintiffs, is unconvincing in light of its overall concern with collusive
settlements.
46 Id. at 258.
47 Id. at 260.
48 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
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similar to those alleged in White were violations of the federal securities laws and created a right of recovery. The court's conclusion that
the White dismissal was more voluntary than involuntary thus seems
to be based on its concern for the adequacy of representation involved.
A class representative who enters into a collusive settlement with the
defendant or faintheartedly prosecutes a colorable claim is clearly not
an adequate representative. To dismiss a class suit with prejudice to
the class under such circumstances would constitute a denial of due
process.
An examination of the assumptions used to justify dismissals with
prejudice for failure to make discovery in other than class actions demonstrates the validity of the result reached in Papilsky. In an early case,
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,49 the Supreme Court held that
entry of a default judgment against a defendant for his failure to make
discovery was not a denial of due process. The Court relied on "the
undoubted rightof the lawmaking power to create a presumption of
fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an answer begotten from the
suppression or failure to produce the proof ordered, when such proof
concerned the rightful decision of the cause."50 Later, in Societe Internationalev. Rogers,51 however, the Court recognized that this presumed
lack of merit might not be sustainable where a plaintiff's good faith
efforts to produce the information requested had failed: "[W]e think
that Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal of the
complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has
been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
15 2
petitioner."
It is difficult to justify an involuntary dismissal of a class action with
prejudice on the ground of "willfulness, bad faith, or any fault" of the
absent members of the represented class or presumed want of merit in
the claim presented. There is little opportunity for "willfulness, bad
faith, or any fault" on their part;53 absent members of the class in the
49 212 U.S. 822 (1909).
50 Id. at 350-51.
51 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
52 Id. at 212.
53 This is not the problem posed in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d
999 (7th Cir. 1971). There, interrogatories were directed not solely to the class representative but to all members of the class, approximately 600 persons; the Seventh Circuit sustained dismissals with prejudice as to those class members who had failed to answer the
propounded interrogatories. The decision is highly questionable; it allows a defendant to
intimidate class members by seeking extensive discovery, perhaps thereby forcing them
from the action. See Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Note,
Civil Procedure: Absentee Class Members Subjected to Discovery and Claims Dismissed
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vast majority of cases would not even know that discovery procedures
were being utilized. Nor can an automatic presumption of want of
merit be created to sustain such a dismissal; rather, as was implied by the
Second Circuit in Papilsky, the dismissal of a colorable claim must be
attributed to either faintheartedness or collusion on the part of the class
representative. As the Second Circuit stated in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hughes: "[T]he totality of the circumstances surrounding the
failure to make discovery must be considered in determining what sanctions to apply .... -"4In the "totality of the circumstances" presented
by the ordinary class action, a dismissal with prejudice for failure to
make discovery, however applicable it might be to the class representative, cannot be justified when applied to the members of the class. Such
a dismissal, where the claim is at least colorable, presents a prima facie
case of inadequate representation. The situation is thus analogous to
that presented in Societe Internationaleand similar due process considerations require the same refusal to utilize the presumptions of lack
of merit or bad faith. To apply these presumptions in the context of a
dismissal of a class action for failure to make discovery would be to destroy the protection of the rights of absent class members that the due
process-adequacy of representation standard was designed to establish.
Dismissals of class actions for want of prosecution present the courts
with similar problems. Two cases, both of some antiquity, reveal the
tension between the special needs of class actions and the court's traditional ability to keep its docket clear of unprosecuted actions.
In Partridgev. St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank 55 the court dismissed
a class action that had been on its docket for nine years without any action being taken in its prosecution. The court did not indicate the effect
that dismissal would have on subsequent actions brought on the same
claim, but the predecessor of rule 23(e), requiring notice for dismissals,
was held "not applicable to dismissals for failure to prosecute under the
circumstances here presented." 50 Nor was it applied in National Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists' Association v. Philad Co., 7 in which a class
action was dismissed pursuant to a district court rule permitting dismissal of an action as of course without prejudice if no steps were taken
for Failure to Respond, 1971 Duan L.J. 1007. A more proper view would be to regard the
class representative as having voluntarily assumed the responsibility of providing whatever

information the defendant may seek from members of the purported class. This appears
to be the approach taken by the court in Wainwright.
54 449 F.2d 51, 57 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 409 US. 363 (1973).
55 130 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1942).
56 Id. at 286.
57 4 F.R.D. 106 (D. Del. 1944).
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in its prosecution for one year. The court stated that the notice provisions
of the predecessor of rule 23(e) were paramount to the local district court
rule but would not be applied "under the circumstances" of the case. 8
The suit had been brought to obtain a declaratory judgment and to
restrain the defendant from collecting license fees it claimed under a
patent; the claim had become moot, however, due to the defendant's
earlier sale of the patent under an order of the court. These circumstances clearly justified the dismissal without notice. The issue in National Hairdressers'was mooted not by collusion or a secret settlement
but rather because of an order of the court itself. The dismissal in
Partridgeis more troublesome. Although the only protest against the
dismissal of that case came from the representative whose laxity had allowed the action to linger on the docket for nine years and it appeared
that the action had been brought merely for purposes of harassment,
the decision may be criticized as not sufficiently safeguarding the rights
of absent class members. The fact that no members of the class appeared to protest the dismissal may not be viewed as indicating a lack
of interest on the part of class members, because no notice of the dismissal was given. Further, class member reliance on prosecution of the
class action may explain the fact that no one intervened to press the
action or brought another action on the same claim during the time
that the suit lay dormant on the docket; this argument is, of course,
more compelling when applied to cases involving shorter periods of
nonprosecution. Dismissal for failure to prosecute may indicate that
the representative has lost interest in the action or may be an intentional attempt to avoid the safeguards established by rule 23(e); in both
cases care must be taken to avoid prejudice to the rights of absent class
members.
The majority of the federal district courts have adopted rules requiring that, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, an action be
dismissed if there has been no prosecution of the action within a stated
period of time. 59 Nearly all dismissals made under these rules are with
prejudice unless the court specifically states otherwise, and no provision
is made for notice to absent class members. 60 Such rules provide insufficient protection for the interests of absent class members.
58 Id. at 107. Compare Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1967) where a class
suit was dismissed with prejudice on a finding of mootness; rule 23(e) was not applied.
59 See, e.g., D. Ariz. R. 38(d) (1 year); C.D. Cal. R. 10 (1 year; specified to be without
prejudice); S.D. Fla. R. 13 (3 months); N.D. Ill. R. 21(a) (6 months); D. Mass. R. 22 (2
years); D. Neb. R. 18 (1 year); S.D.N.Y. R. 23 (1 year); W.D. Tenn. R. 14 (1 year; specified
to be without prejudice).
60 The notice that is required by nearly all the local rules goes to the named party,
here the class representative, or to the attorney only. See, e.g., rules cited note 59 supra.
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The principles behind dismissals with prejudice for want of prosecution were recently approved in Costello v. United States:61
All of the dismissals enumerated in Rule 41(b) which operate as
adjudications on the merits-failure of the plaintiff to prosecute,
or to comply with an order of the Court, or to present evidence
showing a right to the relief on the facts and the law-primarily
involve situations in which the defendant must incur the inconvenience of preparing to meet the merits because there is no initial
bar to the Court's reaching them. It is therefore logical that a dismissal on one of these grounds should, unless the Court otherwise
62
specifies, bar a subsequent action.
This rationale, however, will not withstand analysis in the class action
context.
Where a dismissal for want of prosecution of a colorable class action
claim may be presumed to be the product of collusive action on the
part of the defendant, he cannot be heard to object that he has been
forced to prepare to defend on the merits. On the other hand, where
such a dismissal is the result of bad faith or faintheartedness on the
part of the class representative, the absent members have been inadequately represented and a dismissal with prejudice would be a denial
of due process.
Situations in which the adequacy of representation provided by the
representative is dubious are certainly not limited to those discussed
above. Other examples include failure to present evidence and failure
to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 63 Where an involuntary
dismissal of a class action is due to the failure of the representative to
properly represent absent class members, it will generally be improper
for the court to order or allow the dismissal to be with prejudice to
any but the named representative.
2. The Class Attorney. Inquiry into the adequacy of representation
of the class focuses not only on the character of the representation provided by the class representative but also on that of the attorney he
has selected. It is necessary to inquire whether different considerations
apply where the involuntary dismissal results not from a failing of the
61 865 U.S. 265 (1961).
62 Id. at 286.
63 Note that failure to appeal has been held to render the representation provided inadequate. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973). Compare this decision with
Young v. Higbee Co., 824 U.S. 204 (1945), discussed in text at notes 87-88 infra. But see
Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc. Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), where
it was held, in patent and antitrust actions against a defendant class, that the named
defendant would provide adequate representation for the class despite his expressed
"desire" not to serve as a representative of the class.
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class representative but rather from the inexcusable neglect of the counsel he has retained.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provides that a party may
be relieved from a final judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect" on motion made within a reasonable time not
to exceed one year after entry of judgment. Rule 60(b)(6) provides
that a party may be relieved from judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." A motion under
rule 60(b)(6) need only be made "within a reasonable time." The scope
of these remedies, however, was severely restricted by the Supreme
Court in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., in which the Court stated:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that the dismissal
of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct
imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily
chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this
freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each
party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent .... ",,5
Although rule 60(b) generally vests a high degree of discretion in the
court, 66 the decision in Link seems to foreclose relief from judgment
under rule 60(b)(1) based on the inexcusable neglect of a party's at07
torney.
The rationale of Link, however, is inapplicable to the ordinary class
action. Absent members of the class generally have not voluntarily selected the attorney who will represent them nor will they be in a position to exercise control over the course of the litigation. The principle
64 870 U.S. 626 (1962).
65 Id. at 633-34.
66 See cases cited in 7 J. MooRE, supra note 6,
60.19 (1972).
67 Some courts have acted to protect clients from the inexcusable neglect of their attorneys by utilizing rule 60(b)(6), thus circumventing the restrictions imposed on rule
60(b)(1) by Link. See L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Transport Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D.
Ga. 1970); King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D.R.I. 1969). Rule 60(b)(6), unlike rule
60(b)(1), imposes no time limit for the motion. These courts have held that the inexcusable
neglect appropriate to a 60(b)(6) motion is not the "excusable neglect" of 60(b)(1) and
that rule 60(b)(6) may therefore be invoked where rule 60(b)(1) may not. This interpretation manages to comply with the Supreme Court's holding in Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601 (1949), that rule 60(b)(6) applies only to those circumstances not covered by
the other five subdivisions of rule 60(b). Although it has been suggested that the proper
remedy in such a situation is a malpractice suit against the inexcusably neglectful attorney, see Schwarz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967), these courts have strained
to provide relief from judgment through rule 60(b)(6).
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of voluntary choice on which the rule in Link was based thus cannot
be sustained.
Notice to members of the class that a class action is being maintained
on their behalf provides greater opportunity for their participation in
the action; it is not, however, a sufficient basis for the invocation of the
Link rule. It might be argued that failure to take action protesting the
choice of counsel by the class representative after notice is a sufficiently
voluntary choice of counsel by the class members to make the excusable
neglect of counsel binding on them. Absent a specific inquiry as to the
class member's opinions of named counsel, however, failure to respond
to notice cannot be viewed as dispositive. It cannot generally be expected that, even with notice, the adequacy of representation afforded
by named counsel will be given more than a cursory examination by
the absent class members. More significantly, turning the passive acquiesence of class members in the counsel retained by the representative
into the voluntary selection required by Link would dearly do violence
to the theory underlying rule 23. The rule is intended to provide a
means for the vindication of the rights of small claimants who cannot
be expected to use their own resources to retain counsel and enter an
appearance. In view of the generally small size of the individual claims
and the limited resources of the claimants, no investigation or positive
acceptance of the attorney selected by the class representative may
properly be presumed. 6
The fact that the court has examined the quality of representation
provided by the class attorney in certifying the action as a class action
does not furnish a basis for extending the Link principle to class actions. Approval by the court is not the voluntary choice demanded by
Link; the Link choice must be made by the class, not for the class.
Involuntary dismissals with prejudice that are based on the conduct
of the attorney, like those based upon the failings of the class representative, cannot be justified in the class action situation by any of the
theories used to justify such dismissals in ordinary actions. Involuntary
68 For the same reasons Link should not be applied in two other situations in which
class members cannot realistically be expected to have examined the representation furnished by the named attorney: first, where affirmative action on the part of class members has been required in order for them to become members of the class, see Iowa v.
Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Minnesota v. United
States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (ED. Pa. 1968); second, where a court has exercised
its power under rule 23(d)(2) to send notice designed to ensure that the representative
party will provide adequate representation, see Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc.,
supra; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Kronenberg v.
Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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dismissals with prejudice should therefore not be permitted in class actions.
B.

Statutes of Limitations
Creation of a system that does not permit involuntary dismissals of
class actions with prejudice to the interests of absent class members,
however, will not eliminate all due process problems. The running of
a statute of limitations may unfairly eliminate the ability of absent
class members to assert their claims or diminish the time available for
them to act. 9 Where notice of the maintenance of the class suit has
been received, either officially or unofficially, class members may rely
on the suit being prosecuted on their behalf and not bring actions of
their own. If the statute of limitations has run prior to the involuntary
dismissal of the class action, or to the time that the dismissal is brought
to the attention of absent class members, the statute may bar any
further claims by the class members. This problem is exacerbated by
the extended length of time often required to determine if an action
70
may in fact be maintained as a class action.
The filing of an action found to be properly maintainable as a class
suit is generally held to toll the statute of limitations as to absent class
members.7 1 The involuntary dismissal of a class suit-even when it is
69 The Ninth Circuit avoided the statute of limitations problem in Utah v. American
Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580 (1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. May 7, 1973),
by holding that because the representative's class action count had placed the individual
claims of members of the class before the court, the class members could file and prosecute their claims individually, even though the class action was dismissed by the district
court as inferior to other methods of adjudication, 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969), after
the statute of limitations on the claims had run. In an earlier unreported opinion in
the same case (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review) the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the members of the class had relied upon the class action by not
bringing their own separate actions, saying that to employ the stricter standard of reliance adopted by the district court "seems unreasonably to discourage reliance on class actions." This opinion was withdrawn and the reported opinion issued with all mention
of reliance contained in the earlier opinion eliminated without explanation.
70 See, e.g., Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where over two years
passed between the filing of the action and the determination that it could be maintained
as a class action. Such delays are dearly contrary to the requirement that such determinations be made "as soon as possible." FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
71 See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 573-74 (D. Minn. 1968);
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). But see P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Athas v.
Day, 161 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1958). When the statute may already have run as to some
of the absent class members, filing the suit as a class action does not enable them to assert whatever claims they might have. See Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1965). See
also Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins Co. of America, 43 F.R.D. 169, 178 (D.S.D. 1967). It has
been suggested that whether a particular statute of limitations will be tolled by the filing
of a class suit should be determined by balancing the policies underlying the statute of
limitations and those underlying the rule. Comment, Class Actions under New Rule 23 and
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expressly stated that the dismissal is without prejudice-will reactivate
the running of the statute of limitations.7 2 Class members who have
refrained from bringing their own actions and relied on the prosecution of the class suit may be caught unaware by the running of the
statute and foreclosed from asserting claims they would otherwise have
pursued.
Due process principles and the policies underlying rule 23 converge to suggest that some type of action be taken to provide affirmative
protection for the claims of absent class members. The general standard
by which the courts are to be guided has been previously articulated
as "due regard [for] the nature of the proceeding and the character
73
of the rights which may be affected by it.'1
III.

A

PROBLEM OF RIEMEDIES

There appear to be four alternatives available to eliminate the problems of providing due process for absent class members where a class
suit has been involuntarily dismissed, technically without prejudice.
First, the action could be retained on the court's docket, thus holding
it perpetually open for intervention. Second, a procedure that would
allow proof of reliance on a pending class suit to toll the statute could
be adopted. Third, the class representative could be compelled to continue to press the action. Finally, notice of the involuntary dismissal
could be required and some time period after the sending of notice
provided for the filing of actions. These four alternatives must be examined in the light of their effect on the interests of both class members
and defendants and on attempts at strike-suiting and collusive settlements.
A.

Retention on the Docket of the Court

Retention of an action on the docket of the court, thus providing an
opportunity for intervention by class members, offers a seemingly atFederal Statutes of Limitation: A Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 ViL. L. Ray. 370

(1968).
72 Many states have saving statutes that provide that after an action is dismissed the
statute of limitations will not begin to run until after a period allotted, usually six months
or one year, for the bringing of a new action has expired. See generally 51 Am. JuR. 2D,
Limitation of Actions §§ 301-08 (r970). See also Rheingold, Solving Statutes of Limitation Problens, 4 Amr. JUrL TRIAts 441, 612-13 Fig. 12 (1966), for map showing the savings
statutes of the various states. Federal courts sitting in diversity cases apply state saving
statutes and statutes of limitations. Where there is no federal limitation period to a
federal cause of action, federal courts apply state limitation periods and saving statutes.
Where there is a federal cause of action with a built-in statute of limitations, state saving statutes cannot be applied; there seem to be no federal saving statutes. 51 AM. JUR.
2D Limitation of Actions §§ 73-74 (1970); Rheingold, supra, §§ 42, 56.
73 Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930).
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tractive approach. It is doubtful, however, that such action would be
effective in the absence of notice to class members. The courts may rely
on the initiative of class members to produce further prosecution of
their claims, but to the extent that class members continue to rely on
the existence of the class suit such further prosecution will not occur.
In addition, such a procedure would clearly impose heavy burdens
on defendants. Even if a separate court calendar free of regular docket
calls could be established,7 4 the difficulties that statutes of limitations
were designed to prevent would be perpetuated. As stated by the Supreme Court in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc.:
Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in
their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed
to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a
just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. 75

Indefinite retention on the docket would encourage, rather than prevent, "surprises" and revival of claims after evidence has been lost.
These difficulties alone are a sufficient ground upon which to reject
such a remedy.
B.

Proof of Reliance
A second alternative would be to allow an absent class member to
file an action despite the running of the statute of limitations where
he could show that his failure to bring a timely action was due to his
reliance on the maintenance of the class suit.7

6

This approach has sev-

eral serious defects. First, members of the class cannot always be expected to act promptly and the defendant is therefore subjected to the
hazards noted above by the Supreme Court in the Telegraphers case. 77
Second, the issue of whether the class member truly relied would in
many cases be difficult to resolve. The necessity of proving reliance
might prove a substantial barrier to the prosecution of class members'
claims, and add to the burdens on an alieady overworked federal judiciary.
74 Cf. REPORT AND RECOmfENDATIONS,
75 321 U.S. 342, 848-49 (1944).

supra note 5, at

57.

76 This approach was suggested by the district court in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
77 See text and notes at notes 75-76 supra.
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Compelling Prosecution

Several courts have refused to permit a plaintiff who has presented a
class claim to dismiss that claim where the dismissal represents a deliberate attempt to avoid the notice and court approval provisions of

rule 23(e).78 In Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Co.,70 for example, the court refused to permit the class representative to amend his pleadings"0 to
eliminate all references to the class action. The court, holding that
rule 23(e) applied regardless of the provisions of rule. 15(a), required,
as a prerequisite to the amendment, that the plaintiff give notice to
members of the class of the settlement that had led to the attempt to

amend the pleadings.
It has also been held that, even where there is no bad faith on the
part of the representative, a class suit cannot be dismissed or modified

because the class representative has assumed a special status by his allegation of class representation and has bound himself to represent the
interests of the entire class. In Sheffield v. Board of Supervisors,8 1 the

class plaintiff in a federal voting rights suit decided that he desired a
different result than that originally sought; nevertheless, he was denied
leave to dismiss his complaint. Although the court failed to indicate
that the plaintiff would be compelled to continue to prosecute the action, it relied on the proposition that the class representative had assumed a special status by virtue of his presenting a claim on behalf of
a class-indicating that he had become a "private attorney general."
However salutary the "private attorney general" concept may be in
some areas,8 2 it is misused if invoked to compel continued prosecution

of a class action.

3

Although the concept was implicitly relied upon by

78 Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). But see Saltzman v. Technicolor, Inc., 51 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where the court implied that it would have
dismissed the class claims presented, with prejudice, on motion of the class representative after he had attained his individual goals in the litigation, if it had had before it
sufficient information to assess the viability of the class claims.
70 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. IM. 1970).
80 The plaintiff would normally have come under Rule 15(a) which provides: "A party
may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served ....
"
81 439 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1971).
82 The phrase originated in Judge Frank's opinion in Associated Indus. of New York,
Inc., v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). There the question was one of standing
to challenge administrative action, and the "private attorney general" concept was used
to confer standing on a party injured by that action.
83 The "private attorney general" concept was endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). There the Court remarked
that a plaintiff by bringing a civil rights class action had designated himself a "'private
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the court in Sheffield,8 4 it raises significant due process problems;
whether the class in such circumstances would be afforded adequate
representation seems dubious indeed.
Few courts have discussed what is to occur once dismissal has
been denied.8 5 The courts seem to have proceeded on the assumption that a settlement will be negotiated for the entire class. The alternative of compelling prosecution in spite of the faintheartedness or
presumed bad faith of the class representative is properly rejected. In
such circumstances, the vigor and loyalty with which the original representative would assert the interests of the class is very doubtful.
An instructive case is Young v. Higbee Co."6 In that case, although
no formal class claim was made, an action by two preferred shareholders contesting a plan of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, if
successful, would have benefited the entire class of preferred shareholders. The two plaintiffs sold their stock at a favorable price to two junior
claimants and agreed to discontinue their prosecution of an appeal.
The Supreme Court noted that the statute was designed to enable the
interests of an entire group to be asserted by one representative, but,
more significantly, the Court also found that "[t]he statute neither
compels them to appeal nor to prosecute an appeal already taken contrary to their own interests .
*."..87Despite the "private attorney general" dicta found in some cases, the prosecution of a class action by an
unwilling representative must be rejected as an improper safeguard of
the interests of absent class members. Even if adequacy of representation problems are put aside, it is difficult to see how a class representative who has become a "private attorney general" can be compelled to
continue to prosecute the suit. The only means available would seem
to be through use of the contempt powers of the court. It is difficult to
imagine a procedure that would do more to discourage the bringing
of meritorious class suits than creating an awareness on the part of the
attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority."
Id. at 402. The question there presented, however, was whether the class representative
was entitled to recover attorney's fees and did not at all go to whether a class plaintiff
must continue to press a class action.
84 The court said, "[H]aving instituted a public lawsuit to secure rectification for a
constitutional wrong of wide dimension, they [the plaintiffs] cannot privately determine
its destiny." 439 F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1971).
85 Responding to the problems presented by such action, the court in Rothman v.
Gould, 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), found that the representatives who had taken
such action had indicated their incapacity to provide adequate representation and required published notice to produce intervenors who might continue to prosecute the
action. Rothman is discussed more fully in the text and notes at notes 91-99 infra.
86 324 U.S. 204 (1945).
87 Id. at 212.
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putative class representative that he might be compelled, under threat
of contempt, and at substantial costs to himself, to prosecute an action
merely because he had brought suit as a representative of a class.
D.

Notice

When considering notice as a possible solution to the dilemma posed
by involuntary dismissals it is necessary to note that the focus of the
solution should not be to apprise every class member of the involuntary dismissal but rather to secure adequate protection for the rights
of the class by providing, as far as possible, a representative who will
prosecute the action with the vigor and loyalty that due process demands.
It is to be expected that where an attempt is made to circumvent
rule 23(e) settlement will occur prior to certification and the concomitant notice that a class suit is being maintained.8 8 Courts have assumed
that a suit in which a class claim is made is to be treated as a class suit
for purposes of rule 23(e) when voluntarily dismissed or compromised. 9
The formality of certification has thus been treated as not controlling.
Where an involuntary dismissal would occur before certification the
same assumptions should be made.
The attempt at dismissal in Rothman v. Gould90 came prior to certification of the action as a class action. There the class representative
asserted claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arising out
of the manipulation of stock prices by the defendant. When the representative obtained a settlement of his individual claims, he moved to
strike the class claims on the ground that it was impossible to establish
the existence of a suitable class. This contention was plainly inconsistent with the representative's assertion for over two years that a proper
class existed, and the court rejected it:
It must be presumed, or at least firmly expected, that responsible
lawyers, before they put their names to class allegations, will have
made some minimally careful explorations to satisfy themselves of
the prima facie existence of a class, a claim on behalf of the class,
and their suitability to present themselves in the fiduciary role of
class representatives ....
In the face of that expectation, and with
88 E.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970); Rothman v. Gould, 52 F.R.D.
494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Even
where there is no deliberate attempt to circumvent the provisions of rule 23(e) it is to be

expected that dismissal will occur before the representative has made an "investment" that
is so large as to prevent his giving up the suit.
89 See cases cited note 88 supra.
90 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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no showing either of further researches or of changes in any pertinent circumstances affecting the putative class, counsel will not
be allowed to forget the whole business on the mere assertion that
it was a mistake to begin with. 91
Apart from concern about impositions on the courts, District Judge
Frankel noted that the bringing of the suit may have deterred "the institution of suits by members of the ostensible class" and that "[t]he
passage of time may impair or defeat the rights of others thus deflected
from acting for themselves. ' 92 In the light of the responsibilities the
representative had undertaken, the court said: "It is necessary at least
that some decent notice be given to those plaintiff purported to represent so that such members of what was once said to be a 'class' may
appear, if they wish, to oppose the present application, seek to be substituted as representatives or take other steps appropriate for protection
of their interests. ' 93 The defendants responded to this decision by revoking their settlement offer, and the plaintiff quickly reverted to his
original assertion that a class action might be maintained and that he
intended to prosecute it vigorously. In spite of the plaintiff's assurances,
the court noted that his prior actions cast serious doubt on the quality
of representation he would provide in the future and said that "it is
possible that some other or others could properly fill that role."9 4 The
court, pursuant to its authority under rule 23(d)(2)95 to make orders
for the protection of the class, ordered that notice be published in the
New York Times and the Wall Street Jourial,directed toward obtaining others to fill the representation gap. This notice was required even
though the action had not yet been certified as a class action.9 6 The
court stated that "interdependence of the individual settlement and a
class dismissal must be deemed always suspect, and perhaps never suit97
able."
Counsel in Rothman objected that the notice directed by the court
91 Id. at 495-96.
92
93

Id. at 496.
Id.

94 Id. at 498.
95 Rule 23(d)(2) provides: "[T]he court may make appropriate orders: . . . (2) requiring,

for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the
members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action .... "
96 Two years had passed since the filing of the suit without the court's having determined that the action could indeed be maintained as a class action.
97 52 F.R.D. at 500-01.
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was nothing more than a solicitation of claims. The court correctly
rejected this argument. Notice in such situations is necessary to preserve the rights of the class members, to prevent their being deprived of
the opportunity to assert their rights because apparently adequate representation turned out to be otherwise.""
As the Rothman decision emphasized, brief published notice can
protect the interests of the class by bringing in a new representative of
the interests of the class. Even abbreviated notice, by informing the
members of the bar and the interested class members of the dismissal,
should ensure that a substitute class representative will be provided
where the class claims are meritorious, thereby rectifying any harm that
may have been done by the faintheartedness or bad faith of the original
representative. Such notice should do much to protect the interests of
class members and may prevent strike-suiting and collusive settlements;
a defendant will gain nothing from a collusive settlement with the representative if the class suit is continued by another representative.
Several additional problems not sufficiently considered by the Rothman court must be examined: (1) the effect of the statute of limitations
on those who receive such notice; (2) whether a different rule ought to
exist when it clearly appears that the claim is without merit; (3) whether
a different rule ought to exist where the remedy sought is injunctive or
declaratory relief; (4) who should bear the costs of notice; and (5)
whether a different rule ought to exist where court-directed notice of
the maintenance of the suit has been given and reliance on the maintenance of the action is more likely.
The best method for dealing with the statute of limitations problems
of involuntary dismissals with notice, as indicated by the earlier discussion of the question,9 9 is a dismissal without prejudice and a reopening or tolling of the statute of limitations for a period of time sufficient
to provide an opportunity for the filing of a new action.100 Such a
procedure would give the new representative freedom to cast the action
in the terms he desires and allow him to bring the action in the federal
district he considers most convenient. He would thus not be tied to
the old, defective litigation. The time provided should be sufficient to
08 The court said, id. at 501:

What defendants perceive as a "specter" of unnecessary litigation-with plaintiff's
more passionate counsel finding himself "shocked by so champertous a notice"seems only a chimera rising in the heat of advocacy. The case is in substance close to
the familiar kinds of suits where a settlement or other disposition possibly hurtful
to third parties must be publicized sufficiently to confirm or disconfirm such a
possibility. Notices of that sort cause trouble, defeat expectations, bring new litigants
into court. But nobody supposes they are "champertous" or unnecessary. So much for
the supposed ethical solecism the parties now perceive.
99 See text and notes at notes 71-74 supra.
100 This is analogous to the state saving statutes. See discussion at note 72 supra.
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allow the gathering of forces necessary for the initiation of new litigation. Allowance of a period of one year or the time remaining of the
original limitation period, whichever is greater, after the giving of
notice should provide sufficient time for the filing of a new action and
is in accord with the principles underlying statutes of limitations.
Claims thus would not be allowed to slumber indefinitely. On the other
hand, a defendant who has been made aware that a claim will be asserted against him can not claim impropriety or surprise if an opportunity is given for reassertion of the claim within a strictly limited
period of time.
The justification for notice of involuntary dismissals is preservation
of the rights of absent class members; this justification itself raises the
question of whether notice should be required where the claim presented in class form appears to the court to be without merit. It can
be argued that in such a case notice should not be required; if the claim
is without merit there are no substantial rights to be protected. This
approach, however, would have the disadvantage of involving the court
in extended inquiries into the merits of the claim. 10 1 In addition, where
failure to give notice is due to an incomplete examination by the court
of the merits of the claim, further actions by persons who were members of the class and who relied on the class action might be unfairly
foreclosed. Finally, a restriction of notice to only those situations where
the claims seem to be of merit would allow one last opportunity for
strike-suiting and collusive settlements. A collusive settlement could be
disguised by the parties through an assertion that developments had
made it clear that the class claim was without merit; there would be no
one before the court other than the parties to the settlement to contest
that assertion.
It has been pointed out that an involuntary dismissal of a class action
will prevent absent members of the class from asserting their claims,
even if the dismissal is without prejudice, where the statute of limitations has run. One exception to this problem exists where an action
seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, for there the wrong is a continuing one. Courts have been especially solicitous of these actions, which
nearly always present civil rights claims, permitting liberal interven. and allowing the representative to continue to represent a class
tion' 02
even though his individual claim has been mooted. 0 3 This concern,
- 101 Cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 404 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1972).
102 Norman v. Board of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972); Washington v. Wyman,
54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
103 Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia, 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Rackley v. Board of
Trustees, 258 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965). See also Tortes v. Department of Labor, 318
F. Supp. 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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however, need not inspire a requirement of notice of involuntary dismissal designed to obtain intervenors, for should such an action be
involuntarily dismissed without prejudice, a new claim may be presented at any time by an aggrieved member of the class.
A requirement of notice of involuntary dismissal for certain class
actions raises the question of who should pay for such notice. The court
in Rothman 0 4 directed that the defendants should bear the costs of
notice. The only discussion of the reasons for this order consisted of
the court's noting that if the settlement with the plaintiff were revived
"this small item of expense should be easily manageable."' 10 5 Although
there is authority for imposing on the defendant at least part of the
costs of notice of maintenance of the suit as a class action,"0 " this seems
unfair except in the rare case where the plaintiff has presented a clearly
meritorious claim. Where the plaintiff's claim is fairly debatable the
defendant should not be forced to pay for notice to the class. Where
notice is to follow an involuntary dismissal that has been produced by
either the faithlessness or faintheartedness of the class representative,
the case for placing the costs of notice on the representative seems even
stronger. It is in this context that the "private attorney general" concept is useful. By making a class allegation, the representative has assumed certain duties to safeguard the interests of the class-among
these duties might be included providing notice if the action is to be
involuntarily dismissed. The costs of giving notice sufficient to procure
an alternative representative, for example by publication in a few select
newspapers, will be relatively small; therefore no substantial disincentive to the bringing of a class suit is presented.
Settlement, either secret or openly made subject to rule 23(e), will
almost always occur prior to notice to members of the class of the maintenance of the class suit; this analysis has focused on the requirement
of notice in this situation. It is also necessary, however, to determine
what kind of notice should be required where an involuntary dismissal
occurs after notice of the maintenance of the suit. The choice is between
the limited notice described above and notice commensurate with that
provided the class in informing them of the suit on their behalf. 10 7
104 52 F.R.D. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
105 Id. at 501.
100 See, e.g., Ostapowitcz v. Johnson Bronze, 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Bragliani
v. Biblowitcz, 13 FED. RuLEs SERv. 2d 23b.3, Case 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
107 In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950), the
Supreme Court presented what has been interpreted as the standard by which courts are
to be guided where due process requires notice, saying:
But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due
process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence
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Given that actual receipt of notice may be expected to induce greater
reliance on the part of the represented class, the proper approach should
be to require notice commensurate with the previous notice given, based
on a presumption that every member of the class has received and relied on notice that the action is being maintained on his behalf.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that if the viability of the class action device is to be preserved, its potential as an instrument for the personal aggrandizement
of individual parties must be curtailed and adequate repreientation of
the class ensured. Only by the development of adequate protections for
the interests of the members of the class can this be done. Although the
problem is susceptible to many solutions-for example, the establishment of some sort of controls over the fees realized by attorneys in class
actions-elimination of dismissals with prejudice to absent class members and provision of appropriate notice of involuntary dismissals
represent an effort in one part of this developing body of law to prevent
the use of the class suit as a device for personal profit.
Michael G. Cleveland
that it is reasonably certain to inform those affected . . . or, where conditions do
not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.
This language has been interpreted as setting up a flexible standard. See, e.g., Snyder v.
Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968), where the widespread notoriety the
suit had received in the news media was held sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process. But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 U.S.L.W. 2586 (U.S. May 8, 1973), where
the Second Circuit disapproved a makeshift notice scheme adopted by the district court
that had been designed to give notice to a class of 2,250,000 members. The district court
opinion is reported at 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

